Optionalfetch?: typeof fetchOptionaloauthScopes?: readonly string[]What authorizeUrl asks for: never more than the app client's allowedOauthScopes.
The TOTP secret for an MFA_SETUP challenge, and the session to verify it on.
A new TOTP secret for the signed-in user. The current one keeps working until verifyUserSoftwareToken accepts a code from this one.
The hosted authorize endpoint, sent straight to identityProvider (Google or a tenant IdP).
A wrong previousPassword returns NOT_AUTHORIZED.
credential is WebAuthn RegistrationResponseJSON, as a JSON string.
Confirms the email; the session, when given, signs in without the password.
Redeems an authorization code with the PKCE verifier, authenticating as the client.
Emails a reset code; an unknown address answers the same (preventUserExistenceErrors).
The login's email attribute (AdminGetUser), by username or sub, for a
step that holds only a challenge's username. Null for no such user.
Whether the signed-in user has TOTP turned on (GetUser's UserMFASettingList).
Revokes every refresh token the user holds, in every browser
(AdminUserGlobalSignOut, which needs IAM). username is cognito:username.
Starts USER_AUTH: a password checked at once, a passkey's request
options, or the sign-in ConfirmSignUp handed back as signUpSession.
USER_PASSWORD_AUTH: the password in one call, for a client that allows
that flow. A wrong password and an unknown user both return NOT_AUTHORIZED.
Every passkey the signed-in user has, across all pages.
The hosted logout, which ends the pool's own session for a federated
login and then sends the browser to logoutUri. That must be one of the
app client's logoutUrls exactly: its origins, with no path.
Turns TOTP on as the user's preferred MFA.
New access and ID tokens. username is the token's cognito:username, for the hash.
Revokes the refresh token and every access token issued from it.
Forgot-password for every login, backfilled ones included. A backfilled
user is FORCE_CHANGE_PASSWORD with a temporary password nobody was sent,
a state ForgotPassword refuses, so it first gets a random permanent one
(AdminSetUserPassword, which needs IAM) that the emailed code replaces.
A login linked to Google or a tenant IdP never gets a password: it returns
as if sent, sending nothing, so its IdP stays the only way in.
Self sign-up; Cognito emails a confirmation code. An address that already
has a login returns USERNAME_EXISTS, which callers must not reveal.
WebAuthn PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON, as a JSON string.
Checks the first code; answer MFA_SETUP on the session it returns.
Checks a code from the newly associated secret, which then replaces the old one.
Which ways in the address's login has, for the email step to offer. A
FORCE_CHANGE_PASSWORD login's temporary password was never sent, so it
has none. An unknown address answers as a password login.
The pool's hosted domain, e.g.
auth.cfx.to, without a scheme.